Governor Bill Richardson is a poor choice for Secretary of Commerce or, for that matter, any position in the Obama Administration. President-elect Obama has stated many times that he wants people in his administration who are willing to tell him things that he does not want to hear. This is not the way Governor Richardson operates. I have personal experience with Bill Richardson when he was Secretary of Energy. I opposed his decision to railroad Dr. Wen Ho Lee on bogus espionage charges. Secretary Richardson was not willing to listen to minority opinions on Dr. Lee, and he punished me and others who defended Dr. Lee. We were proven correct when the government settled with Lee for $1.6 million.
The Chinese-American community has correctly claimed that Dr. Lee was identified as an espionage suspect because of his race. I know more about this subject than any other person in the US and agree with this assessment. This is not, however, Bill Richardson’s real problem. Secretary Richardson made three mistakes that raise serious questions about his judgment and character. First, because of political pressure, he refused to listen to minority opinions on Lee. Secondly, even after it was abundantly clear that Lee was not guilty, Secretary Richardson supported pursuing the prosecution. Finally, Secretary Richardson has never apologized to the people that he punished for “not aggressively pursuing Wen Ho Lee.”
Selecting Governor Richardson to serve in the Obama Administration is not “change we can believe in.”
______
Dr. Robert Vrooman was the counterintelligence director at Los Alamos National Laboratory who fiercely objected WHL's arrest. Vrooman himself was reprimanded by Bill Richardson for continuing to oppose the charges and actions against WHL. He supported the campaign to free WHL through many speeches and the media.
See Vrooman's declaration at http://nobillrichardson.blogspot.com/2008/12/investigation-and-treatment-of-whl.html. His declaration stated he believes "the failure to look at the rest of the population is because Lee is ethnic Chinese."
Showing posts with label Robert Vrooman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Robert Vrooman. Show all posts
Monday, December 8, 2008
Saturday, September 13, 2008
Drogin, Vroomer and Clark interview
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec00/wenholee_9-13.html
A few excerpts below:
BOB DROGIN: Gwen, this has been the incredible shrinking prosecution from the start. As you said, he was originally cited, although never charged as a spy, he was branded the spy of the century. By the time they finally got an indictment nine months later, they had something very different. They accused him of downloading, copying a great deal of classified information. It turned out very soon after that that information was classified at the time, or even now is classified at such a level that it essentially could be sent through the US mails. So that was a big problem. Secondly, of course, the defense was able to find a number of experts who were able to challenge and in some cases ridicule the government claims that this data was as crucial and indeed the crown jewels. And then the government had a tremendous problem when their chief witness, the chief FBI investigator in this case, recanted crucial testimony. So they had a tremendous credibility problem with the witness. And then you had a judge who was openly skeptical of government claims. There were a couple of other issues, but essentially the case began crumbling all around them.
BOB DROGIN: It was stunning. It was a very emotional kind of hearing. And afterwards, it was marked by a great deal of laughter and tears. It was quite a statement that he made. It went on for about 30 minutes and he just repeatedly apologized to Dr. Lee. He repeatedly said how sorry he was that he had been put in jail under what he called demeaning and inhumane conditions. He said he had been misled by the government. He said he had been led astray by the government, and particularly singled out what he called the top leadership at the Justice Department, Attorney General Reno and the Energy Department. And then he also singled out a former U.S. Attorney here who brought the original prosecution. So it was a very powerful denunciation of government prosecutorial tactics.
BOB DROGIN: The only thing we do know is that Wen Ho Lee wasn't the source of that.
ROBERT VROOMAN, Former Chief, Counterintelligence, Los Alamos Laboratory: Well, the original case against Dr. Lee was flawed from the beginning. And yet there was an insistence that the case should be pushed forward even though every FBI agent that I worked with said it was flawed, including Mr. Messemer, who used the term to me that it was intellectually flawed.
GWEN IFILL: And I'm curious if you have a sense about what he did, how damaging is the information that he actually downloaded and copied on to unclassified computers?
ROBERT CLARK: Well, although I don't know the exact details of every file that he put on those tapes, in general, the computer codes that we're talking about, although they are used for simulating nuclear weapons, what happens to a nuclear weapon when you ignite it, the stuff that's in the codes is used for thousands of other things, and the methods that are in there are readily available in open literature, and worked on by people at universities and everywhere. The only thing that's really classified about Robert Clarkthem is that when you compile them into a single code and you tell a foreign power that this is the way we do it, they would be interested in knowing that's the way you do it and then they'd look at it and study it. But they certainly -- I certainly do not believe, let's call a spade a spade, we're talking about China, I certainly do not believe the Chinese would ever take these codes and try to design a weapon with these codes. So, I think, I heard the testimony both ways and I believe it was exaggerated both ways. The codes are useful and valuable, but the fact is the vast majority of this stuff is unclassified by vast, almost all, but several lines.
ROBERT VROOMAN: That's a nice choice that you give me. If I have to take one of the two, I would say that he's a naive bungler. He's not a spy. I have maintained that for many years. And I'm very comfortable with that and today I feel vindicated about that.
GWEN IFILL: Mr. Clark, you worked with Mr. Lee in the Los Alamos laboratories. Do you have any sense that the man you worked with, in the laboratory you worked in, would have made him a target because of his ethnic heritage?
ROBERT CLARK: I... I hate to say he was made a target, but clearly, as soon as they found a Chinese-American that had done basically exactly the same things that I had done, I went to China with Wen Ho Lee on one of those trips. I worked on the same codes that Wen Ho Lee worked on. We were good friends. I had access to everything that Wen Ho Lee had access to. But someone obviously felt that he was more likely to be a spy than I was.
ROBERT CLARK: I have to, I have to say that in the real world, justice in the sense of he admitted to a crime, and has been punished, may be true, but the actual crime to which he admitted, I do not believe, is that rare that it deserves a felony on one's record. And if everybody in the country that had ever done something like that had a felony conviction, I would be surprised if anybody in the country who has done something similar to that has a felony conviction for it. So I'm not so sure that this was really justice.
A few excerpts below:
BOB DROGIN: Gwen, this has been the incredible shrinking prosecution from the start. As you said, he was originally cited, although never charged as a spy, he was branded the spy of the century. By the time they finally got an indictment nine months later, they had something very different. They accused him of downloading, copying a great deal of classified information. It turned out very soon after that that information was classified at the time, or even now is classified at such a level that it essentially could be sent through the US mails. So that was a big problem. Secondly, of course, the defense was able to find a number of experts who were able to challenge and in some cases ridicule the government claims that this data was as crucial and indeed the crown jewels. And then the government had a tremendous problem when their chief witness, the chief FBI investigator in this case, recanted crucial testimony. So they had a tremendous credibility problem with the witness. And then you had a judge who was openly skeptical of government claims. There were a couple of other issues, but essentially the case began crumbling all around them.
BOB DROGIN: It was stunning. It was a very emotional kind of hearing. And afterwards, it was marked by a great deal of laughter and tears. It was quite a statement that he made. It went on for about 30 minutes and he just repeatedly apologized to Dr. Lee. He repeatedly said how sorry he was that he had been put in jail under what he called demeaning and inhumane conditions. He said he had been misled by the government. He said he had been led astray by the government, and particularly singled out what he called the top leadership at the Justice Department, Attorney General Reno and the Energy Department. And then he also singled out a former U.S. Attorney here who brought the original prosecution. So it was a very powerful denunciation of government prosecutorial tactics.
BOB DROGIN: The only thing we do know is that Wen Ho Lee wasn't the source of that.
ROBERT VROOMAN, Former Chief, Counterintelligence, Los Alamos Laboratory: Well, the original case against Dr. Lee was flawed from the beginning. And yet there was an insistence that the case should be pushed forward even though every FBI agent that I worked with said it was flawed, including Mr. Messemer, who used the term to me that it was intellectually flawed.
GWEN IFILL: And I'm curious if you have a sense about what he did, how damaging is the information that he actually downloaded and copied on to unclassified computers?
ROBERT CLARK: Well, although I don't know the exact details of every file that he put on those tapes, in general, the computer codes that we're talking about, although they are used for simulating nuclear weapons, what happens to a nuclear weapon when you ignite it, the stuff that's in the codes is used for thousands of other things, and the methods that are in there are readily available in open literature, and worked on by people at universities and everywhere. The only thing that's really classified about Robert Clarkthem is that when you compile them into a single code and you tell a foreign power that this is the way we do it, they would be interested in knowing that's the way you do it and then they'd look at it and study it. But they certainly -- I certainly do not believe, let's call a spade a spade, we're talking about China, I certainly do not believe the Chinese would ever take these codes and try to design a weapon with these codes. So, I think, I heard the testimony both ways and I believe it was exaggerated both ways. The codes are useful and valuable, but the fact is the vast majority of this stuff is unclassified by vast, almost all, but several lines.
ROBERT VROOMAN: That's a nice choice that you give me. If I have to take one of the two, I would say that he's a naive bungler. He's not a spy. I have maintained that for many years. And I'm very comfortable with that and today I feel vindicated about that.
GWEN IFILL: Mr. Clark, you worked with Mr. Lee in the Los Alamos laboratories. Do you have any sense that the man you worked with, in the laboratory you worked in, would have made him a target because of his ethnic heritage?
ROBERT CLARK: I... I hate to say he was made a target, but clearly, as soon as they found a Chinese-American that had done basically exactly the same things that I had done, I went to China with Wen Ho Lee on one of those trips. I worked on the same codes that Wen Ho Lee worked on. We were good friends. I had access to everything that Wen Ho Lee had access to. But someone obviously felt that he was more likely to be a spy than I was.
ROBERT CLARK: I have to, I have to say that in the real world, justice in the sense of he admitted to a crime, and has been punished, may be true, but the actual crime to which he admitted, I do not believe, is that rare that it deserves a felony on one's record. And if everybody in the country that had ever done something like that had a felony conviction, I would be surprised if anybody in the country who has done something similar to that has a felony conviction for it. So I'm not so sure that this was really justice.
Thursday, October 12, 2000
Investigation and Treatment of WHL
http://fas.org/sgp/congress/2000/h101200.html
This is a very long Congressional Record, only a few exhibits have been reproduced below, emphasis have been added.
This is a very long Congressional Record, only a few exhibits have been reproduced below, emphasis have been added.
Declaration of Robert Vrooman
I, Robert Vrooman, do hereby declare and state:
1. I have reviewed the government's response to Wen Ho
Lee's Motion for Discovery of Materials Related to Selective
Prosecution, including the attached Declaration of Special
Agent Robert Messemer. As set out below, Agent Messsemer's
declaration contains numerous false statements. Based on my
experiences with Agent Messemer and the information I have
received from other FBI agents, I believe that the regularly
distorts information.
2. I did not tell Agent Messemer that Lee probably assisted
the Chinese by helping fix Chinese hydrocodes during his
travel in 1986 and 1988. His allegation that I did so is
false. Our April 28, 1999 meeting focused on [approx, one
line deleted] and Agent Messemer's theory that there was
something inappropriate going on [words deleted]. I attended
that interview solely as a favor to John Browne, the director
of Los Alamos National Laboratory. When it was over, I told
Browne that I considered the interview strange, because it
had nothing to do with the Lee case. I later learned from
officials at the CIA that Agent Messemer was falsely
informing CIA officials that I had been critical [word(s)
deleted]. At the time, Agent Messemer was attempting to shift
blame to the CIA for possible fallout [words deleted]. I
sought to obtain a copy of Agency Messemer's memoranda of my
interview and to have it corrected. See Attachment one. The
FBI refused to provide me a copy of this memorandum, which I
expect contains false information.
3. Agent Messemer's statement that the individuals selected
for investigation was chosen because they fit "matrix''
based on access to W-88 information and travel to the PRC is
false. Dozens of individuals who share those characteristics
were not chosen for investigation. As I explained in my prior
declaration, it is my firm belief that the actual reason Dr.
Lee was selected for investigation was because he made a call
to another person who was under investigation in spite of the
fact that he assisted the FBI in this case. It is my opinion
that the failure to look at the rest of the population is
because Lee is ethnic Chinese.
4. Mr. Moore's contention that the Chinese target
ethnically Chinese individuals to the exclusion of others,
therefore making it rational to focus investigations on such
individuals was not borne out by our experience at Los
Alamos, which was the critical context for this
investigation. It was our experience that Chinese
intelligence officials contacted everyone from the
laboratories with a nuclear weapons background who visited
China for information, regardless of their ethnicity. I am
unaware of any empirical data that would support any
inference that an American citizen born in Taiwan would be
more likely than any other American citizen [deletion].
5. Of the twelve people ultimately chosen for the short
list on which the investigation focused, some had no access
at all to W-88 information, and one did not have a security
clearance, but this individuals is ethnically Chinese. I do
not believe this was a coincidence. Further, this ethnically
Chinese individual did not fall within the "matrix'' which
Agent Messemer claims was used by the DOE and FBI. In
addition, although there were other names on the HI list, Mr.
Trulock made clear that Dr. Lee was his primary suspect.
6. Agent Messemer deliberately mischaracterizes the nature
of my comments to him regarding my concerns about Dr. Lee's
travel to the PRC. I did consider it unusual that Dr. Lee had
not reported any contact by Chinese agents when I debriefed
him following his return from the PRC. I did not believe then
and I do not believe now that Dr. Lee engaged in espionage,
and I made no such intimation to Agent Messemer. Dr. Lee and
his wife Sylvia were both cooperating with FBI
investigations, and I considered them loyal Americans.
Nonetheless, I considered Dr. Lee naive, and therefore a
potential security risk. It was to keep Dr. Lee out of harm's
way, not because I had any fear that he might knowingly
engage in improper conduct, that I recommended against
further unescorted trips out of the country for Dr. Lee.
7. My concerns about the real motivation behind the
investigation were exacerbated when I received a classified
intelligence briefing from Dr. Thomas Cook, an intelligence
analysis at LANL, in September 1999. This briefing put to
rest any concerns that I may have had that Dr. Lee helped the
Chinese in any substantial manner.
8. In my capacity as a counterintelligence investigator at
LANL, I was brief on the existence of an investigation code-
named "Buffalo Slaughter'' some time in the late 1980s
involving a non-Chinese individual working at DOE laboratory
who transferred classified information to a foreign country.
That individual was granted full immunity in return for
agreeing to a full debriefing on the information that he
passed. [Approx. six lines deleted].
9. The statements contained in my Declaration dated June
22, 2000 are true and correct and I so attest.
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the
United States that the foregoing
[[Page H9891]]
is true and correct. Executed August 10, 2000, at Gallatin
Gateway, Montana.
[signed]
Robert Vrooman.
Amnesty International Protests Solitary Confinement, Shackling of Dr. Wen Ho Lee
Washington, DC, Aug. 16, 2000.--Amnesty International, the
world's largest human rights organization, has written to
Attorney General Janet Reno to protest the conditions under
which Dr. Wen Ho Lee has been held in pre-trial federal
detention since December 1999.
In the Aug. 4 letter, released as Judge James A. Parker
hears a renewed application for Dr. Lee's release on bail,
Amnesty International expressed concern at reports that Dr.
Lee has been held in particularly harsh conditions of
solitary confinement, and has been confined to his cell for
23 hours each day. According to reports, Dr. Lee has also
been shackled at the wrists, waist, and ankles while taking
exercise once or twice a week in a federal enclosure. Amnesty
International is insisting that the use of shackles be
immediately discontinued.
These conditions are unnecessarily punitive and contravene
international human rights standards, said Curt Goering,
Senior Deputy Executive Director of Amnesty International
USA. The use of shackles is extremely disturbing and is
grossly inappropriate in the circumstances.
Rule 33 of the United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners provides that restraints
should be used only when strictly as a precaution against
escape during transfer, on medical grounds on the direction
of the medical officer or to prevent damage or injury. The
rules also state that restraints should never be applied as
punishment and that chains or irons shall not be used as
restraints. The rules also provide that every prisoner
(including pre-trial detainees) should have at least one hour
of suitable exercise in the open air daily.
Amnesty International believes that the overall conditions
under which Dr. Lee is detained contravene international
standards, which require that all persons deprived of their
liberty be treated humanely and with respect for their
inherent dignity. Amnesty International is urging the Justice
Department to urgently review Dr. Lee's conditions of
confinement and ensure that he is being treated in accordance
with international standards. Such steps should include
provision for adequate exercise and out-of-cell time and
reasonable contact with the outside world.
American Bar Association, Washington, DC, August 18, 1999.
Hon. Janet Reno,
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Reno: We are writing to express our deep concern
about recent accounts that race may have played a significant
factor in pursuing the investigation of Dr. Wen Ho Lee for
alleged espionage. While we do not condone acts of espionage
or any other illegal activity by any individual, we ask that
you ensure that race is not now a factor as you make
decisions regarding this and other investigations and
prosecutions involving security violations at Los Alamos and
other national laboratories.
According to Senators Fred Thompson and Joseph Lieberman in
a statement issued on August 5, 1999, the Department of
Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had multiple
suspects for leaks of nuclear warhead information and yet
only two--Dr. Lee and his wife--were investigated. Because
the DOE and FBI investigators failed to look into the other
suspects "--that is, to assess whether these others were not
for some reason equally suspicious--meant that it was
impossible to be sure that the Lees really did stand out as
the prime suspects.'' (Thompson/Lieberman Report p. 18.) This
account is further buttressed by recent statements made by
Robert S. Vrooman, former chief of Counter-Intelligence at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Mr. Vrooman stated that
Dr. Lee was targeted for investigation mainly because of his
ethnicity, and that there is no evidence that Dr. Lee leaked
secrets to China. Mr. Vrooman noted that at least 13
Caucasian scientists from Los Alamos "who went to the same
[physics] institute and visited the same people'' as Dr. Lee
were left out of the investigation.
[[Page H9890]]
Furthermore, both the Thompson/Lieberman Statement and Mr.
Vrooman noted that key technical information concerning
certain weapons, whose acquisition by the Chinese government
initiated the investigation of Mr. Lee, was available to
numerous government and military entities that could have
been the source of the leaked information.
While we recognize that Mr. Vrooman's statements will be
subject to debate, we believe that it is important that you
verify that no "racial profiling'' occurred in this
investigation. Additionally, we would like to request a
meeting with you to discuss these issues. In the meantime, we
ask that as you continue your investigation of security leaks
at our national laboratories, you do so with a heightened
consideration for fairness.
Sincerely,
Nancy Choy,
Executive Director, National Asian Pacific American Bar Association.
Daphne Kwok,
Executive Director, Organization of Chinese Americans.
Jin Sook Lee,
Executive Director, Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance, AFL-CIO.
Jon Melegrito,
Executive Director, National Federation of Filipino American Associations.
Debasish Mishra,
Executive Director, India Abroad Center for Political Awareness.
Karen Narasaki,
Executive Director, National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium.
Tuesday, October 3, 2000
Vrooman's Congressional Testimony
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2000/vrooman.html
Statement of
Robert S. Vrooman
before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts
"A Continuation of Oversight of the Wen Ho Lee Case"
October 3, 2000
Chairman Specter and members of the committee, I am honored to have the opportunity to testify before this committee about the investigation of Dr. Wen Ho Lee.
In this opening statement I will address three issues, ethnic profiling, FBI and Los Alamos cooperation during the Kindred Spirit investigation and the 1994 FBI investigation of Dr. Lee.
Many people have questioned why the investigators into the original allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage failed to look beyond Los Alamos National Laboratory and Dr. Lee. Those asking this question include such distinguished people as former Senator Rudman, Senators Thompson and Lieberman and recently FBI Director Louis J. Freeh. It is my opinion that the Kindred Spirit investigators had a subtle bias that the perpetrator had to be ethnic Chinese. I base my opinion on their comments and actions prior to and during the investigation.
These comments include noting something nefarious about the number of Chinese restaurants in Los Alamos, the number of Chinese postdoctoral employees and suggesting that DOE should not allow ethnic Chinese to work on classified programs. In April 2000, a Los Alamos scientist who worked on intelligence programs wrote a letter to the employee news bulletin. He said, "While I was assigned to NIS-9, I supported, on a part time basis, the counterintelligence investigation into the alleged Chinese espionage at Los Alamos. Based on my experience and observations, I concluded that racial profiling of Asian-Americans as a result of the investigation indeed took place, but principally at the Department of Energy. Further, DOE personnel directed some Los Alamos National Laboratory staff to undertake research that profiled Asians and Asian-Americans at the Laboratory. I do not believe any of us were happy with this. I feel insulted, personally and professionally, that the DOE is seeking to spread the tarnish that belongs on it, by having the Weapons Complex undergo the mandatory diversity stand down by May 5th."
The author of the above letter is referring to a request from DOE Headquarters to Los Alamos and Livermore for a list of Chinese-Americans and the programs that they were working on. Both labs refused to provide such a list because the request was clearly in violation of EO 12333.
Director Freeh recently testified to a joint hearing of the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees that the FBI opened a case on Lee based on the DOE Administrative Inquiry which stated that "Wen Ho Lee appears to have the opportunity, means and motivation" to compromise the W-88 information. Director Freeh is correct that the DOE inquiry stated this, but I would like to add that every time Lee's motive was discussed it came down to his ethnicity. There was no other motive ever suggested.
I would also like to note that the DOE inquiry was flawed because Lee did not have ready access to all of the W-88/Mark 5-reentry system or another US system that was similarly compromised. He would seem at best to be only one source of the complete leak. The FBI, of course, had no way of knowing this unless the DOE inquiry was a complete and rigorous investigation.
In spite of our reservations about the Kindred Spirit investigation, we cooperated fully with the FBI in all subsequent investigations involving Dr. Lee. From the day the FBI informed us that they intended to conduct an investigation into Dr. Lee, FBI representatives expressed similar reservations about the Kindred Spirit analysis. In my opinion, the FBI should not have accepted this case until certain issues were resolved. I am willing to elaborate on these issues in closed session if the committee desires.
As a result of serious questions about the DOE inquiry, the FBI did not assign an agent to this case on a full-time basis. It was added to one agent's already full caseload. The failure to aggressively resolve the allegations against Dr. Lee was a great source of frustration to Los Alamos Director Sig Hecker and me. On February 14, 1997 I had an acrimonious meeting with the FBI counterintelligence squad chief in Albuquerque, and he agreed to assign an agent to the investigation on a full-time basis. After this occurred we saw some progress on the case including a FISA request.
On October 15, 1997 that agent told me that he was going to work on the Peter H. Lee case and requested Los Alamos' assistance in the investigation. Once again, we had no agent assigned full time to the Wen Ho Lee case. That was the situation when I retired from Los Alamos on March 13, 1998.
On February 23, 1994, during an officially approved six-person Chinese delegation to Los Alamos, Dr. Lee met with a member of the delegation. This meeting occurred in the presence of all of the US and Chinese participants, however, and was reported in writing to the FBI by a US participant This document is classified but available to the committee from the author.
I was not aware that this meeting resulted in a FBI investigation until Director Freeh testified to that on September 26, 2000. For the record, let me state that this investigation occurred without any request for assistance from Los Alamos. We were not aware of any FBI interest in Dr. Lee until July 3, 1996.
We should not lionize Dr. Lee. He has much to answer for. On the other hand, he was not treated fairly. There are many examples, but I am most disturbed by the leaking of the investigation, along with his name, to the media. This single act destroyed the integrity of the investigation as well as adversely impacting Dr. Lee. As a result of this, I doubt if we will ever solve the mystery of how the Chinese obtained US nuclear weapons secrets.
Finally I am concerned about the collateral damage from the Lee case, particularly the adverse impact it has had on our nuclear weapons labs. Former Senator Howard Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton recently reported that the arbitrary security changes at the national labs has damaged morale, productivity and recruitment. In my opinion, this is all the more outrageous because the national labs have had and continue to have good security. If we look at what really counts, which are results not audits of paperwork and procedures, security at the labs has been better than all other government agencies. Results are reflected in the number of people in the last fifty years who were convicted, confessed to or fled the country to avoid prosecution for espionage. When we look at this by organization, the results reflect favorably on the DOE complex. We have two cases in the DOE and neither case involved the compromise of nuclear weapons information. During the same time period there were ten cases in the CIA, three in the FBI, seven in the NSA and over 80 in the DOD. When one considers that the DOE population is at least an order of magnitude larger than all but DOD, this record is impressive.
I believe that we must act quickly to repair the damage to our national labs so that the talent in the labs is available to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Statement of
Robert S. Vrooman
before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts
"A Continuation of Oversight of the Wen Ho Lee Case"
October 3, 2000
Chairman Specter and members of the committee, I am honored to have the opportunity to testify before this committee about the investigation of Dr. Wen Ho Lee.
In this opening statement I will address three issues, ethnic profiling, FBI and Los Alamos cooperation during the Kindred Spirit investigation and the 1994 FBI investigation of Dr. Lee.
Many people have questioned why the investigators into the original allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage failed to look beyond Los Alamos National Laboratory and Dr. Lee. Those asking this question include such distinguished people as former Senator Rudman, Senators Thompson and Lieberman and recently FBI Director Louis J. Freeh. It is my opinion that the Kindred Spirit investigators had a subtle bias that the perpetrator had to be ethnic Chinese. I base my opinion on their comments and actions prior to and during the investigation.
These comments include noting something nefarious about the number of Chinese restaurants in Los Alamos, the number of Chinese postdoctoral employees and suggesting that DOE should not allow ethnic Chinese to work on classified programs. In April 2000, a Los Alamos scientist who worked on intelligence programs wrote a letter to the employee news bulletin. He said, "While I was assigned to NIS-9, I supported, on a part time basis, the counterintelligence investigation into the alleged Chinese espionage at Los Alamos. Based on my experience and observations, I concluded that racial profiling of Asian-Americans as a result of the investigation indeed took place, but principally at the Department of Energy. Further, DOE personnel directed some Los Alamos National Laboratory staff to undertake research that profiled Asians and Asian-Americans at the Laboratory. I do not believe any of us were happy with this. I feel insulted, personally and professionally, that the DOE is seeking to spread the tarnish that belongs on it, by having the Weapons Complex undergo the mandatory diversity stand down by May 5th."
The author of the above letter is referring to a request from DOE Headquarters to Los Alamos and Livermore for a list of Chinese-Americans and the programs that they were working on. Both labs refused to provide such a list because the request was clearly in violation of EO 12333.
Director Freeh recently testified to a joint hearing of the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees that the FBI opened a case on Lee based on the DOE Administrative Inquiry which stated that "Wen Ho Lee appears to have the opportunity, means and motivation" to compromise the W-88 information. Director Freeh is correct that the DOE inquiry stated this, but I would like to add that every time Lee's motive was discussed it came down to his ethnicity. There was no other motive ever suggested.
I would also like to note that the DOE inquiry was flawed because Lee did not have ready access to all of the W-88/Mark 5-reentry system or another US system that was similarly compromised. He would seem at best to be only one source of the complete leak. The FBI, of course, had no way of knowing this unless the DOE inquiry was a complete and rigorous investigation.
In spite of our reservations about the Kindred Spirit investigation, we cooperated fully with the FBI in all subsequent investigations involving Dr. Lee. From the day the FBI informed us that they intended to conduct an investigation into Dr. Lee, FBI representatives expressed similar reservations about the Kindred Spirit analysis. In my opinion, the FBI should not have accepted this case until certain issues were resolved. I am willing to elaborate on these issues in closed session if the committee desires.
As a result of serious questions about the DOE inquiry, the FBI did not assign an agent to this case on a full-time basis. It was added to one agent's already full caseload. The failure to aggressively resolve the allegations against Dr. Lee was a great source of frustration to Los Alamos Director Sig Hecker and me. On February 14, 1997 I had an acrimonious meeting with the FBI counterintelligence squad chief in Albuquerque, and he agreed to assign an agent to the investigation on a full-time basis. After this occurred we saw some progress on the case including a FISA request.
On October 15, 1997 that agent told me that he was going to work on the Peter H. Lee case and requested Los Alamos' assistance in the investigation. Once again, we had no agent assigned full time to the Wen Ho Lee case. That was the situation when I retired from Los Alamos on March 13, 1998.
On February 23, 1994, during an officially approved six-person Chinese delegation to Los Alamos, Dr. Lee met with a member of the delegation. This meeting occurred in the presence of all of the US and Chinese participants, however, and was reported in writing to the FBI by a US participant This document is classified but available to the committee from the author.
I was not aware that this meeting resulted in a FBI investigation until Director Freeh testified to that on September 26, 2000. For the record, let me state that this investigation occurred without any request for assistance from Los Alamos. We were not aware of any FBI interest in Dr. Lee until July 3, 1996.
We should not lionize Dr. Lee. He has much to answer for. On the other hand, he was not treated fairly. There are many examples, but I am most disturbed by the leaking of the investigation, along with his name, to the media. This single act destroyed the integrity of the investigation as well as adversely impacting Dr. Lee. As a result of this, I doubt if we will ever solve the mystery of how the Chinese obtained US nuclear weapons secrets.
Finally I am concerned about the collateral damage from the Lee case, particularly the adverse impact it has had on our nuclear weapons labs. Former Senator Howard Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton recently reported that the arbitrary security changes at the national labs has damaged morale, productivity and recruitment. In my opinion, this is all the more outrageous because the national labs have had and continue to have good security. If we look at what really counts, which are results not audits of paperwork and procedures, security at the labs has been better than all other government agencies. Results are reflected in the number of people in the last fifty years who were convicted, confessed to or fled the country to avoid prosecution for espionage. When we look at this by organization, the results reflect favorably on the DOE complex. We have two cases in the DOE and neither case involved the compromise of nuclear weapons information. During the same time period there were ten cases in the CIA, three in the FBI, seven in the NSA and over 80 in the DOD. When one considers that the DOE population is at least an order of magnitude larger than all but DOD, this record is impressive.
I believe that we must act quickly to repair the damage to our national labs so that the talent in the labs is available to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Friday, August 13, 1999
Energy Secretary Urges Nuclear Lab to Punish 3 Over Security
By JAMES RISEN
Published: August 13, 1999
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson has recommended disciplinary action against a former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and two other officials for failing to handle properly the spy investigation at the lab, officials said today.
Mr. Richardson acted in response to a critical new report by the department's Inspector General that focused on the actions of 19 current or former officials at Los Alamos and at Energy Department headquarters who were involved in investigating evidence that China had stolen nuclear secrets.
The officials said one of Mr. Richardson's recommendations was aimed at Siegfried Hecker, director of Los Alamos in 1986-97, who still works there as a scientist. He also recommended to the current director, John Brown, that action be taken against Terry Craig, until recently a counterintelligence team leader at the lab, and Robert Vrooman, former chief of counterintelligence.
Mr. Craig is still employed at the lab; Mr. Vrooman has retired but works for a lab contractor. Mr. Craig and Mr. Hecker did not return telephone calls seeking comment; Mr. Vrooman could not be reached.
The form of discipline is up to Mr. Brown, but officials say Mr. Craig could be fired and Mr. Vrooman's ties to the lab could be ended. It is unclear what Mr. Hecker faces.
Mr. Brown said he would act soon.
The full report is classified, and does not assign specific blame. But it does include ''implied criticism'' of the actions of the former Energy Secretary, Federico Pena, and of the former Deputy Secretary, Elizabeth Moler, for not being more aggressive in handling the investigation, officials familiar with the report said.
In the face of mounting criticism, Mr. Richardson had promised action, but he decided to wait for the Inspector General's review.
In March a Los Alamos scientist, Wen Ho Lee, the chief suspect in the espionage investigation, was fired for security violations at the lab. He has not been charged with any crime, and he has denied that he spied for China. After he was fired, investigators found he had conducted unauthorized transfers of secrets from a classified computer into an unclassified network.
The United States Attorney in New Mexico has been considering whether to seek an indictment against Mr. Lee for his handling of classified information. Mr. Lee has stated that he transferred the data to protect the contents as a routine part of his job.
The Inspector General's report focuses on the investigation of Mr. Lee, particularly the failure of officials to restrict his access to classified material or to monitor his computer until long after he came under investigation.
Mr. Hecker was cited for failing to follow through on ''an express request by senior management to develop a plan for limiting the suspect's access, for failing to inform department's management that the plan had failed, and for failing to take alternative actions,'' according to a statement by Mr. Richardson. Though he did not name Mr. Hecker, other officials said his reference was to Mr. Hecker.
Mr. Vrooman was cited for allowing Mr. Lee continued access to nuclear secrets.
Mr. Craig, who was also not identified in the statement, was cited for failing to determine whether Mr. Lee had signed a waiver allowing monitoring of his computer. Mr. Lee signed the waiver in April 1995.
Published: August 13, 1999
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson has recommended disciplinary action against a former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and two other officials for failing to handle properly the spy investigation at the lab, officials said today.
Mr. Richardson acted in response to a critical new report by the department's Inspector General that focused on the actions of 19 current or former officials at Los Alamos and at Energy Department headquarters who were involved in investigating evidence that China had stolen nuclear secrets.
The officials said one of Mr. Richardson's recommendations was aimed at Siegfried Hecker, director of Los Alamos in 1986-97, who still works there as a scientist. He also recommended to the current director, John Brown, that action be taken against Terry Craig, until recently a counterintelligence team leader at the lab, and Robert Vrooman, former chief of counterintelligence.
Mr. Craig is still employed at the lab; Mr. Vrooman has retired but works for a lab contractor. Mr. Craig and Mr. Hecker did not return telephone calls seeking comment; Mr. Vrooman could not be reached.
The form of discipline is up to Mr. Brown, but officials say Mr. Craig could be fired and Mr. Vrooman's ties to the lab could be ended. It is unclear what Mr. Hecker faces.
Mr. Brown said he would act soon.
The full report is classified, and does not assign specific blame. But it does include ''implied criticism'' of the actions of the former Energy Secretary, Federico Pena, and of the former Deputy Secretary, Elizabeth Moler, for not being more aggressive in handling the investigation, officials familiar with the report said.
In the face of mounting criticism, Mr. Richardson had promised action, but he decided to wait for the Inspector General's review.
In March a Los Alamos scientist, Wen Ho Lee, the chief suspect in the espionage investigation, was fired for security violations at the lab. He has not been charged with any crime, and he has denied that he spied for China. After he was fired, investigators found he had conducted unauthorized transfers of secrets from a classified computer into an unclassified network.
The United States Attorney in New Mexico has been considering whether to seek an indictment against Mr. Lee for his handling of classified information. Mr. Lee has stated that he transferred the data to protect the contents as a routine part of his job.
The Inspector General's report focuses on the investigation of Mr. Lee, particularly the failure of officials to restrict his access to classified material or to monitor his computer until long after he came under investigation.
Mr. Hecker was cited for failing to follow through on ''an express request by senior management to develop a plan for limiting the suspect's access, for failing to inform department's management that the plan had failed, and for failing to take alternative actions,'' according to a statement by Mr. Richardson. Though he did not name Mr. Hecker, other officials said his reference was to Mr. Hecker.
Mr. Vrooman was cited for allowing Mr. Lee continued access to nuclear secrets.
Mr. Craig, who was also not identified in the statement, was cited for failing to determine whether Mr. Lee had signed a waiver allowing monitoring of his computer. Mr. Lee signed the waiver in April 1995.
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